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Abstract 
A smart toy is defined as a device consisting of a 
physical toy component that connects to one or more 
toy computing services to facilitate gameplay in the 
cloud through networking and sensory technologies to 
enhance the functionality of a traditional toy. A smart 
toy in this context can be effectively considered an 
Internet of Things (IoT) with Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
which can provide Augmented Reality (AR) 
experiences to users. In this paper, the first assumption 
is that children do not understand the concept of 
privacy and the children do not know how to protect 
themselves online, especially in a social media and 
cloud environment. The second assumption is that 
children may disclose private information to smart toys 
and not be aware of the possible consequences and 
liabilities. This paper presents a privacy rule 
conceptual model with the concepts of smart toy, 
mobile service, device, location, and guidance with 
related privacy entities: purpose, recipient, obligation, 
and retention for smart toys. Further the paper also 
discusses an implementation of the prototype interface 
with sample scenarios for future research works.  
 
1. Introduction  
A toy is an item or product intended for learning or 
play, which can have various benefits to childhood 
development. The modern toy industry is comprised of 
establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing 
dolls, toys and games. As such a substantial part of 
human development, toys have continued to maintain a 
presence in the daily lives of billions of individuals of 
all ages. While primitive toys included rocks and 
pinecones, they soon progressed into dolls, stuffed 
animals and trains. Traditionally, toys have been 
entirely autonomous and without any processing or 
networking capabilities to communicate with any other 
device. While a child user is engaged with a traditional 
toy, it will collect and store no personal data, and 
require no reason for concern for a child’s privacy. 
With the introduction of electronic toys with embedded 
systems, electronic toys can have sensory capabilities, 
and the ability to collect and store inputted data based 
on the user’s interactions. This data is limited and used 
only for the interaction, often discarded immediately. 
An electronic toy has limited or no networking 
capability. Thus, privacy concerns are limited to 
nonexistent in this context. In the past few decades, 
electronic toys such as Speak & Spell, Tamagotchi, 
and Furby had become popular. 
A smart toy has been defined as a device consisting 
of a physical toy component that connects to one or 
more toy computing services to facilitate gameplay in 
the cloud through networking and sensory technologies 
to enhance the functionality of a traditional toy [1]. A 
smart toy in this context can be effectively considered 
an Internet of Things (IoT) with Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) which can provide Augmented Reality (AR) 
experiences to users. Examples of these are Mattel’s 
Hello Barbie and Cognitoys’ Dino. Smart toys are able 
to gather data on the context of the user (e.g., time of 
day, location, weather, etc.) and provide personalized 
services based on this context data. However, the user 
may not be comfortable with the level of data that is 
collected and inferred on them. 
There are three general properties of a smart toy: 
(1) pervasive – a smart toy may follow child through 
everyday activities; (2) social – social aspects and 
multiplayer are becoming a mandatory aspect of 
interactive smart toys in a one-to-one, one-to-many and 
many-to-many relations [2]; and (3) connected – smart 
toys may connect and communicate with other toys 
and services through networks. For example, 
Cognitoys’ Dino can listen and answer questions raised 
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by children by voice because the Dino connected to the 
IBM Watson’s knowledge called Elemental Path’s 
“friendgine”, which is a child-friendly database at the 
backend. Some research studies found out that children 
have emotional interactions with dolls and stuffed toys 
in anthropomorphic design [3]. Some children even 
prefer to take the toy to the dinner table or make a bed 
for it next to the child’s own [4]. Many studies found 
that anthropomorphic toys such as a teddy bear or 
bunny serve a specific purpose, as children trusted such 
designs and felt at ease disclosing private information. 
As a result, Toy Computing is a recently developing 
concept which transcends the traditional toy into a new 
area of computer research using services computing 
technologies [5]. In this context, a toy is a physical 
embodiment artifact that acts as a child user interface 
for toy computing services in cloud. A smart toy can 
also capture child user’s physical activity state (e.g., 
voice, walking, standing, running, etc.) and store 
personalized information (e.g., location, activity 
pattern, etc.) through camera, microphone, Global 
Positioning System (GPS), and various sensors such as 
facial recognition or sound detection. In 2015, a new 
invention called the “Google Toy,” which is an 
internet-connected teddy bear and bunny, like an 
anthropomorphic device with speech and face 
recognition functions that will have the ability to 
control smart home appliances and devices at home. 
However, this toy has caused many criticisms from the 
media as people express concern about privacy 
breaching and safety issues by Google. 
More specifically, the toy makers are confronted 
with the challenge of better understanding the 
consumer needs, concerns and exploring the possibility 
of adopting such data-collected smart toys to rich 
information interface in this emerging market. For 
example, many toy designers have been researching 
the balance between the level of private information a 
toy collected from a child and the level of personalized 
features the toy provided to the child. Referring to the 
direction of the United States Federal Trade 
Commission Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) and the European Union Data Protection 
Directive (EUDPD), the definition of a child to be an 
individual under the age of 13 years old. In this paper, 
the first assumption is that children do not understand 
the concept of privacy and the children do not know 
how to protect themselves online, especially in a social 
media and cloud environment. The second assumption 
is that children may disclose private information to 
smart toys and not be aware of the possible 
consequences and liabilities. 
Breaches of privacy can result in threats to the 
physical safety of the child user [6]. While the parents 
(or any legal guardians) of a child strive to ensure their 
child’s physical and online safety and privacy, there is 
no common approach for these parents to control the 
information flow between their child and the smart 
toys they interact with [7]. As smart toys are able to 
collect a variety of data such as text, picture, video, 
sound, location, and sensing data, this makes the 
context far more complicated than many other smart 
devices in particular given that the subjects are mainly 
children in a physical and social environment. Parental 
control is a feature in a smart toy for the parents to 
restrict the content the children can provide to the toy. 
Though the toy industry has also issued regulations for 
toy safety, these regulations have no mention of 
privacy issues in this toy computing paradigm. 
This paper presents a privacy rule conceptual 
model with the concepts of toy, mobile service, device, 
and guidance with related privacy entities: purpose, 
recipient, obligation, and retention for the toy 
computing environment. In this model, the parents/ 
legal guardians are the owners of their child’s data 
which is collected on their child (the data subject) in 
according to COPPA and EUDPD. Parents provide 
consent through access rules which allow their child’s 
data to be shared according to their preferences and 
privacy compliance. This paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 discusses related works and Section 
3 presents the conceptual model with related 
algorithms. Next, Section 4 discusses the model in a 
prototype interface with example scenarios. Section 5 
concludes the paper with future works. 
 
2. Related Work 
Recently the topic of smart toy is gaining 
increasingly more public interest. For example, Yahoo 
Canada published a report called “Electronic toy maker 
VTech’s zero accountability clause puts onus for hacks 
on parents” on February 12, 2016, which said: “the 
collection of data through toys and apps geared 
towards children presents a growing challenge. In 
Canada we have a very restrictive and well defined 
privacy act for the healthcare domain. In the toy 
industry, they see all those safeguards and guidelines 
and they only talk about the safety of a toy. Those 
guidelines have not caught up to the information 
collecting aspect.” This report shows the public 
concerns on the toy safety and privacy issues in our 
society. However, there is limited research on this 
specific cross-disciplinary research topic in toy 
computing. For example, AlHarthy and Shawkat [8] 
discuss a security solution to protect the network data 
from unauthorized access from controlling unmanaged 
smart devices, but they do not provide a generic 
privacy rule conceptual model for this paradigm. Next, 
Armando et al. [9] describe a technical approach to 
secure the smart device paradigm based on a given 
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organization’s security policy, but without discussing 
the privacy protection model from the perspective of 
users. Then, Peng et al. [10] present threat detection 
and mitigation mechanisms on mobile devices in a 
prioritized defense deployment, but they do not cover a 
privacy rule model to tackle the requirements of 
accessing mobile services. Referring to the research 
works in IoT, Alqassem and Svetinovic [11] describe 
the challenges to tackling IoT privacy and security 
requirements as follows: (1) it is difficult to determine 
what information should be protected, when to protect 
it, and to whom access should be granted/restricted; (2) 
IoT consists of diverse technologies and the integration 
of these technologies may lead to unknown risks; and 
(3) the changing nature of the environment plays an 
important role when dealing with the privacy and 
security vulnerabilities of the IoT. Though there is a lot 
of related research in security and privacy of IoT, there 
is no standardized model which focuses on smart toys 
in this paradigm. For example, Sun et al. [12] proposes 
a personal privacy protection policy model based on 
homomorphism encryption in IoT, but there is no 
specific privacy rule design.  
With all of this in mind, privacy is a growing 
concern among many users of mobile devices. While 
many users appreciate the value of targeted services in 
mobile devices, they still express concern over how 
their data is collected and managed without their 
knowledge. For example, Cherubini et al. [13] identify 
privacy as a barrier to the adoption of mobile phone 
context services. 70% of consumers say it is important 
to know exactly what personal information is being 
collected and shared [14], while 92% of users 
expressed concern about applications collecting 
personal information without their consent [15]. 
Mobile applications have adapted countless services to 
better analyze context data and provide custom 
services that will bring the most value to a user based 
on what they are most likely to need. While allowing 
context data to be collected for services can prove to be 
of great benefit to users, there is an ongoing tradeoff 
between utility and privacy [16]. In summary, smart 
toys which embrace sensory and networking 
capabilities open up new threats to privacy [17], 
stimulate new user requirements [18], and establish a 
unique case for privacy rule model in toy computing. 
To our best knowledge, there is still no legislation or 
industry standard which specifically regulates security 
and privacy requirements for smart toys. 
For illustration, the conceptual model we discuss in 
this paper focuses on how to protect the child’s 
location information based on IETF RFC6280. 
Referring to IETF RFC6280 by Barnes et al. [19], 
Geopriv is an Internet Best Current Practice for 
location and location privacy in internet applications, 
which enables users to express preferences for the 
disclosure of their location information. For example, 
the user can make a rule that their location is not to be 
disclosed beyond the intended recipient. This 
architecture binds the privacy rules to the data so that 
receiving entities are informed of when their data is 
shared to other parties. Various techniques have been 
used in attempt to preserve the privacy of a user’s 
location. Some approaches include degrading quality, 
creating fake location points, uncertainty, pseudonyms, 
sharing opaque identifiers using symmetric key 
encryption, k-anonymity through cloaking. 
Pseudonyms and k-anonymity methods have been 
proven inadequate for protecting users’ location data 
and preventing re-identification. 
On the other hand, location-based services, also 
known as location-aware mobile services, have become 
widely popular to provide information such as events, 
traveling, shopping and entertainment. Location-based 
services have been defined by Duri et al. [20] as 
“services in which the location of a person or an object 
is used to shape or focus the application or service”. 
Pura [21] identifies location as one of the most 
promising applications of mobile commerce, due to the 
ability to allow service providers to offer customized 
services based on context and resulting in increased 
perceived value and loyalty of customers.  
The mobile application industry has observed a 
widespread adoption of mobile game applications such 
as Pokemon Go [33]. This has been successful due to 
factors such as increased mobility and social network 
integration [22]. Location-based services have also 
been used in applications for games. The popular 
mobile game Angry Birds [23] has a location-based 
feature which allows users to compete with other based 
on a leader board associated with their location. Next, 
MyTown [24] is another mobile game, reminiscent of 
Monopoly, where users can check in to a physical 
location, buy and sell properties, and collect rent from 
other players who check into the same location. Then, 
Kaasinen [25] conducted a study to investigate user 
needs for location-aware mobile services: 
 Contents: topical up to date information, 
comprehensive relevant information, interaction 
(user is moving and can only provide limited 
interaction to device), push information based on 
both location and personalization, detailed search 
options, planning vs. spontaneity.  
 Personalization: personal options and contents, 
user-generated content. 
 Seamless service entities: consistency, seamless 
solutions to support the whole user activity. 
 Privacy: the right to locate, use, store, and forward 
the location. Privacy requirements are based on 
legislation and social regulation. The paper also 
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identifies Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 
[26] as a potential approach to manage user privacy 
preferences and compare them to the location-
aware service’s privacy practices. P3P is a privacy 
policy framework created by the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C), based on the eXtensible 
Markup Language (XML), designed to help end 
users manage their privacy while navigating 
websites that have differing privacy policies. User’s 
privacy preferences are expressed using A P3P 
Preference Exchange Language (APPEL), which 
enables websites to express their privacy practices 
in a standard format that can be retrieved 
automatically and interpreted easily by users of P3P 
browsers. We also adopt the concepts built in P3P 
into our conceptual model. 
 
3. Privacy Rule Conceptual Model  
Privacy rules can be achieved through privacy 
preserving mechanisms such as access control. In order 
to provide the most relevant content, the smart toy will 
need to collect certain context data such as the child’s 
location, and also potential profile information such as 
age and gender to help determine what their interests 
may be based on demographic. To gain even more 
context of the child, the smart toy may collect and 
retain historical data on the child such as previous 
movement patterns via GPS, camera and various 
sensors, to determine where the child is likely to be at 
certain times, if the child is travelling, or previous 
interactions with the smart toy such as which content 
they had previously been interested in. It is clear that 
the more information is collected on the child, the 
more relevant services can be provided to the child. 
However, the user may not be comfortable with the 
level of data that is collected and inferred on them [27]. 
There are countless types of data that can be collected 
from smart toys that must be considered when 
evaluating the scope of privacy. This is true of 
collected sensory data, and also from within other 
applications, sensitive data can be collected such as a 
user’s profile information, contact list, or calendar. All 
of this information can be collected and analyzed to 
determine context data about the children and then the 
smart toy may provide personalized functions [28]. 
Referring to Figure 1, the children (users) may 
interact with different smart toys from different toy 
makers in a physical and social environment such as 
Mattel’s Hello Barbie and Cognitoys’ Dino. The smart 
toys may be equipped with camera, microphone, GPS, 
and sensors for face and sound detection. These smart 
toys may send the collected information such as text, 
picture, video, sound (voice), location and sensing data 
to the toy computing services, which are published and 
managed by different toy computing providers and 
even bind with other third party services, in the cloud. 
Each smart toy should have its own privacy policy that 
outlines information including how it will collect, 
manage, share, and retain the user’s personal data [28]. 
In the privacy rule conceptual model, a subject is a 
3-tuple entity comprised of a smart toy, a device, and a 
mobile service. The mobile service may communicate 
with external entities over a network, such as other 
devices or cloud services. The user who interacts with 
the subject is a child (data subject) who is associated 
with an identity and a parent (data owner) who is in 
control of their data. In this model, access control 
decisions are based on permissions which are assigned 
by the parent, comprised of a list of rules for operations 
(read, write, etc.) and objects. Figure 2 illustrates a 
core access control model which allows parents to 
manage their privacy preferences for access to their 
child’s location data, as an illustrative example. In the 
toy computing environment, location data is 
particularly sensitive data because it is the location of 
the child using the toy. The location object is sensitive 
information when associated with the user’s identity 
since it allows other entities to be aware of the child’s 
physical location. The motivation for this access 
control model is to protect this property from being 
shared with untrusted external entities. The motivation 
for this access control model is to protect this property 
from being shared with untrusted external entities. 
Traditional access control models make access 
decisions (permit/deny) based on low level operations, 
such as read and write, for describing a subject’s 
operation on an object. For example, user A is allowed 
to read file B, in which case user A is the subject, file B 
is the object, and read is the operation. Figure 3 
presents an extended access control model for privacy 
in a toy computing environment. This model shows the 
privacy access control model extended over top of the 
core access control model discussed in Figure 2. In the 
privacy access control model, a request <Subject, 
Operation, Object, Purposes, Recipients> as input, and 
a response <Decision, Obligations, Retentions> as 
output, as well as an optional acknowledgement 
<Subject, Event> through a communication channel. 
In the privacy rule conceptual model, a subject is a 
3-tuple entity comprised of a smart toy, a device, and a 
mobile service. The mobile service may communicate 
with external entities over a network, such as other 
devices or cloud services. The user who interacts with 
the subject is a child (data subject) who is associated 
with an identity and a parent (data owner) who is in 
control of their data. In this model, access control 
decisions are based on permissions which are assigned 
by the parent, comprised of a list of rules for operations 
(read, write, etc.) and objects. Figure 2 illustrates a 
core access control model which allows parents to 
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manage their privacy preferences for access to their 
child’s location data, as an illustrative example. In the 
toy computing environment, location data is 
particularly sensitive data because it is the location of 
the child using the toy. The location object is sensitive 
information when associated with the user’s identity 
since it allows other entities to be aware of the child’s 
physical location. The motivation for this access 
control model is to protect this property from being 
shared with untrusted external entities. The motivation 
for this access control model is to protect this property 
from being shared with untrusted external entities. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Toy Computing 
 
Traditional access control models make access 
decisions (permit/deny) based on low level operations, 
such as read and write, for describing a subject’s 
operation on an object. For example, user A is allowed 
to read file B, in which case user A is the subject, file B 
is the object, and read is the operation. Figure 3 
presents an extended access control model for privacy 
in a toy computing environment. This model shows the 
privacy access control model extended over top of the 
core access control model discussed in Figure 2. In the 
privacy access control model, a request <Subject, 
Operation, Object, Purposes, Recipients> as input, and 
a response <Decision, Obligations, Retentions> as 
output, as well as an optional acknowledgement 
<Subject, Event> through a communication channel. 
In our extension for preserving privacy, we have 
proposed four privacy-based entities: PURPOSES, 
RECIPIENTS, OBLIGATIONS and RETENTIONS 
based on P3P into the model [26] described as follows: 
 PURPOSES: is a set of purposes in the system. A 
subject must specify a set of purposes in the 
corresponding access request. A purpose can be 
described as different sub-purposes or combined 
into a general purpose in a hierarchical structure 
[29]. Figure 4 shows an illustrative hierarchical 
structure to represent purposes that could be related 
to toy computing. Different purposes can be 
generalized as the root element “AnyPurpose”, 
which is the most general purpose in the system. 
“AnyPurpose” can be subclassified as “Personal 
Purpose”, “MarketingPurpose”, “Administrative 
Purpose”, “GamePurpose” and “ResearchPurpose”. 
Each of these can further be subclassified into more 
specific purposes.  
 RECIPIENTS: is a set of recipients of the 
collected object(s) belonging to the subjects/users 
in the system. Each collected object has a 
corresponding set of recipients. In the context of 
toy computing and P3P, recipients can be described 
as one of the following categories: 
a) Individual: the subject who made the request or 
an individual in the system.  
b) Group: a group of users (e.g., the group of 
USERS or SUBJECTS currently engaged in a 
toy computing game session). 
c) Third-party: an entity which does not belong to 
the system, but is constrained by and 
accountable to the object owner. This includes 
EXTERNAL_ENTITIES in Figure 3. 
d) Anyone: any subject or external entity. 
 OBLIGATIONS: is a set of obligations in the 
system that is necessary to be accepted after access 
permission is granted. The obligations describe the 
rules that a subject agrees to comply with after 
gaining the access permission. Obligations are 
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generally bound to legislation and agreements (e.g., 
“No disclosure to an unauthorized third party”). 
 RETENTIONS: is a set of retention policies in the 
system to be enforced after permission is granted. 
Each object may have a corresponding retention 
policy to enforce the duration for how long it may 
be used or retained. It is recommended that a 
child’s location data be retained only for the time 
necessary for the stated purpose. Based on the 
context of P3P, the retention policy can be 
described as one of the following categories: 
a) No-retention: the requested object is not 
retained for more than a brief period of time, 
after which it must be destroyed without being 
logged, archived or stored by the recipients. 
b) Stated-purpose: the requested object is retained 
for the time required to meet the stated purpose 
and will be discarded as soon as possible after 
the purpose is satisfied. 
c) Legal-requirement: the requested object is 
retained to meet a stated purpose (as required by 
law or liability under applicable law). 
d) Business-practices: the requested object is 
retained under the stated business practices. 
e) Indefinitely: the requested object is retained for 
an indeterminate period of time. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Core Access Control Model 
 
 
Figure 3. Extended Privacy Access Control Model 
 
Figure 4. Illustrative Purpose Hierarchy Structure 
 
While we are concerned with location data, some 
relevant categories are shown in Figure 5 as follows: 
a) AnyLocationObjectType: is a general 
description of any location object type. 
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b) Absolute Location: is the location expressed in 
a range or exact GPS coordinates, latitude and 
longitude. The absolute location can be 
expressed as coarse (GPS-based, approximate 
location) or fine (network-based, precise 
location) [30].  
c) Relative Location: is the location relative to 
another entity as a reference point. Relative 
location can be expressed as the distance 
between user A and user B, user A and device C, 
or user A and location D.  
d) Categotical Location: is the location expressed 
in a predefined category. Some examples 
include home, office, street, mall, or restaurant. 
 
 
Figure 5. Location Object Types 
 
Referring to Figure 3, a subject has access to an 
object, only if the access is authorized by the core 
access control. Also, the subject needs to specify the 
purposes of the access and the recipients of the result 
of the access operation. The purposes and the 
recipients must be legitimated according to the access 
of the object defined by the owner or an authority such 
as the government. Thus, obligations and a retention 
policy will be returned as a response message if the 
access is allowed. The subject must also comply with 
the obligations and the retention policies. The access 
request will be denied otherwise. 
Parents can create policy rules for their child’s data 
through the process illustrated in Figure 6. This process 
is done through a mobile Web interface on the mobile 
device. The policy rule creation process starts with the 
initialization phase, whose first step is for the parent to 
configure themselves as the child (user)’s parent. By 
mapping a parent to a child user, the parent becomes 
the owner of the child’s data. Next, the parent consents 
to the End User License Agreement (EULA) on behalf 
of the child, agreeing to the terms of the mobile 
service. Lastly, the parent sets their communication 
channel (e.g., email address) and preferences for 
receiving acknowledgements of privacy updates related 
to their child’s data. As the second step, the parent can 
create policy rules according to their preferences for 
how their child’s data can be collected and shared. This 
model uses positive authorization, in which parents 
define the rules for what is allowed. To create a policy 
rule, the parent first specifies the subject (their child), 
the object (e.g., absolute location data), the allowed 
operation (e.g., read), the allowed purposes (e.g., game 
purpose), and the allowed recipients (e.g., other users 
in-game). Next, the parent specifies the obligations and 
retention policies that the recipient must comply to in 
order to receive the data object with an expiry date. 
After a rule is created, this second step can be repeated 
to create as many rules as desired. Step 3 shows the 
administrative tasks to manage the privacy rules. 
 
 
Figure 6. Privacy Rule Creation Process 
 
 
Figure 7. Access Control Decision Process 
 
The access control decision procedure in the privacy 
access control model is described in Figure 7. A 
subject first requests access to a user’s location 
information, specifying the subject, object, operation, 
purposes, and recipients. After receiving the request, as 
the second step, the privacy access control model 
processes the request as follows: (1) checks the owner 
of the requested object; (2) retrieves the corresponding 
privacy rules from the system; and, then, (3) checks the 
acknowledgment communication channel for the 
subject owner. Next, as the third step, the decision is 
made by: (1) checking the permissions from the core 
access control model; (2) checking the allowed 
purposes; and, then, (3) checking allowed recipients. 
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As the fourth step, the final decision is made and the 
system returns a response and acknowledgement. The 
response can be either permit, along with the 
obligations and retention policy or deny. If applicable, 
the acknowledgement is sent to the subject owner 
through the predefined acknowledgement channel, and 
contains the subject and event. Lastly, the model 
records all of the above in the audit logs. 
 
 
Figure 8. Example Scenario 1: Sphero 
 
4. Discussion  
Referring to a toy computing scenario, in this 
section we present some example scenarios using Tek 
Recon, and Sphero to illustrate some possible privacy 
access control rules based on the model.  
 
Scenario 1: Sphero [31] is another recent toy 
computing product in the industry, first introduced in 
2011 by Orbotix, which then released subsequent 
versions, Sphero 2.0 in 2013 and Sphero Ollie in 2014. 
Referring to Figure 8, Sphero is a robotic ball which 
can be controlled and programmed through the user’s 
smartphone or tablet. There are over 30 apps available 
for Sphero, most of which are games, while others are 
focused on education. This product is marketed not 
only to children and can be appropriate for any age 
group. While the physical ball component is a very 
simple and traditional concept, the capabilities of the 
toy increase substantially with the inclusion of robotics 
and a mobile device. The Sphero ball has wireless 
networking capabilities, an accelerometer and 
gyroscope, rolls in every direction, and glows different 
and a mobile device. The Sphero ball has wireless 
networking capabilities, an accelerometer and 
gyroscope, rolls in every direction, and glows different 
colors. Sphero can be programmed by the user through 
an app called Sphero Macrolab, which includes a set of 
predefined macros, and more advanced users can use 
another app called orbBasic to program in a language 
based on BASIC. A parent may access their child’s 
location records collected by Sphero. They may update 
their contact information for receiving 
acknowledgements. Some examples of privacy rules 
for this scenario are presented as follows. 
Privacy rules: 
S1.1: A parent/guardian (data owner) is allowed to 
read or copy his child’s location record 
(Parent/Guardian, read, locationRecord, _, _, permit, _, _) 
(Parent/Guardian, copy, locationRecord, _, _, permit, _, _) 
 
S1.2: A parent/guardian is allowed to update 
his/her contact information 
(owner, update, ContactInformation, _, _, permit, _, _) 
 
Scenario 2: Tek Recon [32]: is a line of toy blasters 
developed by Tech4Kids, marketed to children aged 8 
years and up in 2013. While this product features a 
physical component identical in concept to a traditional 
toy blaster, the novelty is the ability to integrate with a 
mobile device. Referring to Figure 9, the Tek Recon 
blaster features a mount on top where a smartphone is 
inserted. A mobile application has been developed by 
Tech4Kids which operates in collaboration with the 
physical blaster to augment traditional blaster-based 
games. The application provides several functionalities 
including a scope, which uses the smartphone camera 
to display what is in front of the user with additional 
features overlaid on top, such as ammunition, score, 
radio, and a GPS location map of other players. The 
application has networking functionality to create and 
join games with friends over a LAN or mobile 
network. The user is also required to create an account 
online, where the scores and account information are 
stored. As shown in Figure 9, a child using Tek Recon 
has been connected to a mobile service using location 
services in a toy computing environment to share his 
location to their friends and see their locations in 
return. Once the service receives the user’s location 
record, the service may read and disclose the location 
information to other players for the purpose of the 
game, and delete the records immediately after the 
game is complete. An example of privacy rule for this 
scenario 2 is presented as follows. 
 
 
Figure 9. Example Scenario 2: Tek Recon 
Privacy rule: 
S2.1. A service is allowed to read the absolute 
location record of a user for the purpose of a game if 
and only if the service follows obligations of disclosure 
to group “game” and not to keep the record after stated 
game purpose has ended.  
(MobileService, read, Absolute_Location, GamePurpose, 
Group:Game, permit, _, StatedPurpose) 
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Referring to Figure 10, we present a demo of an 
interface for parents to use in an initial setup to 
configure preferences and create policy rules. These 
options would appear during initial setup of a toy 
computing application. These privacy settings allow 
parents to create access control rules based on their 
preferences on concepts from P3P, i.e. purposes, 
recipients, obligations, and retentions. The first step in 
the configuration process is the Profile Setup phase. 
The Profile Setup phase includes three sections, the 
Parent Contact Details, Child Information, and Privacy 
Policy Review. The parent enters their basic 
information including name and email address, and 
then selects if they wish to receive email updates on 
their child’s privacy-related information. Next, on the 
Child Information page, the child’s first name is 
entered for management purposes, and the parent then 
agrees to take ownership over their child’s data. Next, 
the privacy policy of the toy application is presented to 
the parent to review. The parent reviews the policy and 
must confirm that they have read and agree to the 
terms before proceeding. By agreeing to the terms, the 
parent is providing consent on their child’s behalf. 
 
 
Figure 10. Prototype Interface Demonstration 
 
The next phase is the Privacy Rule creation phase, 
when the parent is able to create one or more privacy 
rules for how their child’s private location data is used. 
By default, there is no policy rules yet configured. A 
new rule can be created or a template can be used. 
Templates of useful policy rules can be provided to 
simplify the rule configuration process for parents. The 
first step of creating a new privacy rule is the General 
Settings. In the General Settings, the parent can name 
the rule, provide a description, and set an expiry date 
for how long the rule will be in effect. Next, in the 
Core Access Control settings, the mobile service 
(subject), location resource (object), and operation are 
selected. The objects selected are the absolute location 
and relative location. Next, the settings for Purposes 
and Recipients are also presented. The parent chooses 
from a list of purposes they wish to accept, as well as a 
list of types of recipients. The types of recipients can 
be expanded to be more specific, such as Third-Party: 
Marketing, or Group: Game Players. 
The next steps are the Obligations and Retention 
settings, and then finally reviewing and adding the 
rule, as shown in Figure 10, the parent first selects the 
obligations that the service must comply with upon 
receiving the child’s data. Obligations can include 
compliance with PIPEDA or COPPA. The parent can 
also search from a list of other obligations, or input a 
custom obligation policy. For retention, the parent can 
select how long they wish to allow their child’s data to 
be retained. Finally, on the Review & Add Rule page, 
the privacy rule is presented in plain English. Once the 
parent reviews the rule, they can select “Confirm and 
Add Rule” at the bottom of the screen. Once a privacy 
rule is added, the parent is directed to the Manage 
Privacy Rules page, which shows a table of all of the 
configured privacy rules and their status (e.g., enabled, 
disabled, or expired). This provides options to enable, 
disable, edit, delete, or create new rules. A parent can 
also return to this screen at a later time to manage rules 
or renew expired rules. Once the parent is satisfied 
with the privacy rules, he/she can select “Next” to be 
directed to the final Review & Finish page. This page 
summarizes all of the settings and confirms that the 
parent has completed all of the sections. A list of 
enabled privacy rules and their corresponding expiry 
dates is also presented. Finally, the parent can select 
“Save and Finish” to save their settings and finish the 
setup. Then the settings will take effect immediately. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper presented a privacy rule conceptual 
model for smart toys which is one of the first attempts 
in this emerging research topic. The model allows 
parents to create privacy rules and receive 
acknowledgements regarding their child’s privacy 
sensitive location data. Next, we presented the 
algorithm for access control decisions for privacy 
enforcement, and finally we illustrated the applicability 
of the privacy rules in a practical environment using 
example scenarios with popular toy computing toys in 
the industry. We are currently conducting an empirical 
study to justify the user acceptability of the prototype 
interface for the privacy rule conceptual model. 
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